One of the more troubling aspects in Iran, the Middle East in general, and thus in a future Iraq, is that there is very little experience with political pluralism or with a ‘loyal opposition’. Governments largely dominated by a single faction, like the Shiite theocracy in Tehran, may claim to be responsive to the ‘democratic’ input of their citizens, but opposition parties are generally viewed as potential insurrections – threats to the regime – and thus must be dealt with harshly, or their activities strictly monitored.
With a very real insurgency being waged in Iraq, the Shia leadership I worked with proved very reluctant to make any type of outreach to political leaders outside of their party network. I watched many community leaders from the outskirts of Baghdad attempt to lobby the Provincial Council for improvements to their villages; unfortunately these villages are largely Sunni, and thus are suspected of harboring terrorists. The council kept these Sunni leaders at arm’s length – and often did not hide their contempt for them. Most decisions I saw made by the council directly favored the Shia communities of inner-city Baghdad.
Tellingly, in conversations with many Provincial Council members, they explained their vision for bringing security to Baghdad – which involved plain-clothes agents and citizen ‘informants’ – and which sounded eerily like the methods used by Saddam to manage (and brutalize) the Shiite population for so long. Many Shiites are more than willing to use their new-found political power to turn the tables and use the state security forces on their Sunni brethren.
As my relationship with Governor Tahan improved, I would more frequently be called (at odd hours of the night), to be made aware of significant security-related events that took place in Baghdad. Obviously, Tahan had more than altruistic reasons for feeding me information, and keeping open channels to the State Department and the commanding general of Multinational Division – Baghdad (both of whom I reported to) proved useful to him a number of times throughout my tour. There is a delicate dance between the U.S. Mission, the Shia political elite, and a Sunni community that is torn between insurgency and political marginalization.
Thus, an organization like the PRT often finds itself acting as a broker between various Iraqi factions, and serving to create more ‘political space’ between them. Each faction usually has a moderate element that seeks accommodation and an armed wing that seeks domination over, influence with, or revenge on other factions. Meanwhile, a foreign jihadist element wants to ensure that no accommodation can ever be reached, and a criminal element seeks to profit from the chaos. Such is politics in Iraq. Despite these challenges, progress is being made to help political engagement win out over armed struggle and to convince all factions that there is something to be gained in coming to the table.
The U.S. Mission in Iraq continues to evolve to more effectively deal with the massive challenges brought about by the military action in Iraq and the removal of the Saddam regime. However, it is clear that ultimately the future of Iraq will be determined more by the broader political factors and social forces currently at work in the Middle East neighborhood; not least of these the ancient feud between Sunni and Shia for the heart of the Islamic world and the prize of Mesopotamia.
