The underlying dilemma in Iraq is that the major factions have yet to come to grips with the enormous reversal in their situations. Their perceptions - and not the reality on the ground - is where we have to begin to understand the conflict.
The Shia have emerged dominant with full control over the reins of state control – yet they remain deathly afraid of Sunni resurgence. After decades of submission they never, ever want to fall under the control of a Sunni regime again. They see complete annihilation of any Sunni challenge as a precursor to their own survival. They actually think they can lose.
On the other hand, the Sunni insurgency fully believes that they will prevail once again over the Shi’ites, and will again rule Iraq. They also know, from their own experience, that the best way to govern Iraq is to brutalize and repress all opposition populations. They never want to face the kind of brutality that they themselves dealt out to the Shia. They actually think they can win.
These are the perceptions that govern the behavior of these main factions, and are the leading source of the ongoing sectarian strife.
The reality for the Shia is that they could afford to pursue accommodation with the Sunni minority and would actually benefit from having Sunni expertise and experience in managing the country.
The reality for the Sunni is that they will never again be able to seize total control of the regime. They should seek accommodation with the ruling majority and offer their expertise to secure a key supportive role in the regime.
The Shia perception of fear is being fed by the regime in Tehran, who is also driven by fear. The Iranian regime needs the fear of American, European and Russian imperialism to maintain authority in its own society, and harnesses this fear to serve its foreign policy in threatening Israel and challenging Arab power in the region.
Sunni perceptions are being fed by neighboring Arab powers – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf states – who also have their own ‘Shia’ problems, i.e., disgruntled minority and opposition groups, and see the use of force as the only means of control available for their regime to maintain authority.
Therefore, the dynamics driving the violence in Iraq involve the Shia need for fear, and the Sunni need for force. Hardcore elements on either side are dominating the discourse, ensuring that any hand that reaches out to the other side is cut off immediately. Shia who reach out to the Sunni are foolish – and Sunni who reach out to the Shia are weak.
The key to peace in Iraq is in changing this dialectic, where fear is replaced with confidence – and force is replaced with compromise.
