Radio interview on State College's WBLF (AM 970)
Radio show went great- much thanks to Jeff Byers and WBLF for having me on- we had some good callers and I thought we had a good, pretty wide-ranging discussion on Iraq and some of my experiences in the Embassy. Obviously, one of the first questions asked (and generally one that everybody wants a read on) is the whole - 'are we making any progress over there?' question. Very legitimate question- and one that's hard to answer without merely reinforcing somebody's pre-existing bias. Because if you answer either flatly 'Yes' - or 'No' - then about half the people you are talking to will just tune out to the rest of what you say. So, this is how I try to frame my response – I feel it’s very important to explain what I saw over there, why I think the problems are occurring like they are, and what’s being done about them. The upsurge in violence on the streets of Baghdad is the main case in point. Why is this happening? I feel it’s important to explain some of the factors involved. I think the main thing to remember is that war (and violence) is an extension of politics in one way or another. It is key to remember that Maliki’s government is barely three months old at this point – and there are still so many deals to be cut and things to shake out before there is any real sense of political stability and legitimacy being projected. Another key factor, and very much related, is something that I was intimately acquainted with – the transition of Iraq’s security forces to these new (civilian) political leaders. For several years US and Coalition leaders have been working with, training, equipping and guiding a whole new cadre of security forces. Last year saw key developments in the political environment, with a permanent government being elected. This year, starting earlier this spring, we started making serious moves to connect these new politicians to the security leaders. Many Iraqi generals frankly feel more comfortable working with the Americans that have been training them for the past few years, than with a new – and unpredictable – crew of Iraqi politicians. Needless to say, but ‘civilian oversight over the military’ is not a concept that comes easily in the region. I believe this is causing a tension that is preventing a more effective response to the violence in Baghdad. Trust and loyalty are touchstones for military leaders, and they have yet to develop any of that with their political masters. A third factor that I bring up now, is an institutional – and somewhat bureaucratic – issue, but something that I think is also contributing to the weak response to the violence. A very centralized government is being decentralized, with new jurisdictions being carved out by local leaders and competing security units. The security apparatus of Iraq’s government is in flux, as responsibilities are being shifted from national control down to regional, provincial and municipal authorities – who may not have the experience or the resources to fully bear them. There- a somewhat convoluted response, but maybe that’s just a reminder that there aren’t any easy answers here.
