Balance

I was thinking I'd try to get into answering Brian's question of a couple of days ago (about why exactly it is difficult to sell tomatoes) - and sort of move into the broader issue of...well... what the hell is going on over here? Yeah, that's a toughy. So let me get into my little piece and hopefully it sheds light on the picture in a way that car bombings and throat slashings don't quite cover. The challenges here have a lot of components. First, we're rebuilding stuff and then people blow it up. Or they kill the people that are contracted to build the stuff- and then blow it up. Extreme examples- but that's the first aspect of the environment. Stuff gets blown up. But what's also very tragic about that environment is that it stymies in a huge way any type of risk-taking. Which is essential for any type of private enterprise to get started. So who can take on that type of risk? Well, you- the American taxpayer- through your government and the transitional government in Baghdad. And for the past three years we've accepted the risk of laying out capital that may get blown up and make no return. We're also working against the heritage of centralized state-ownership, or heavy state-control for most major producers. Reliance on the government for nearly all major services, coupled with the hesitance to to do anything without government approval, has greatly affected the business climate here, much like in the post-Soviet sphere. Not to say that there aren't incredibly competent businessmen in Iraq- far from it. But the environment rewarded only those close enough to Saddam to be above the law, or those clever enough to circumvent the system and fly under Saddam's radar. So this should give a general picture of why it's tough to solve our tomato problem. First, it's difficult to find the private investment to build a canning factory. Second, the government- supported by your tax dollars- could build the canning factory, but who would have the impetus to successfully operate it? Our huge dilemma right now in this reconstruction is that for the past three years we've been dumping money into huge projects, trying to get anything and everything built here- but because of the culture, we've merely replaced one centralized bureaucracy for another. Iraqis are accustomed to just asking the Army to build everything. Completely understandable, considering. So my discussion with Prof. Assad was really less about tomatoes than it was about the future of Iraq. We are trying to find ways to get stuff built- without a complete reliance upon The Government.There has been a real shift in our strategy over the past several months. For all the talking heads and debate about timetables and strategies that you might hear, the reality is that there are conscious efforts being made to effectively hand the country back over to Iraqi control- as soon as possible. The conference I attended in Baghdad was specifically about 'the next phase'. Across the board, we are shifting our focus from using reconstruction money to merely rebuild this country's infrastructure and essential services; it is now a tool to build a political system. We are working directly with local and provincial governments to determine what projects they want to build and we merely assist them, and try to make the environment more secure. They are going to debate over priorities, and they will assign the contracts, and they will be responsible for the success or failure of providing for their citizens. And the voters will reward or punish them later this year. Insha-allah, god-willing, it will be a step in the right direction.