Reacting to the unconventional nature of the military's role in Iraq, units deploying there began organizing themselves differently than they typically would for the large-scale combat operations that standard doctrine calls for. These novel adjustments, over several years of deployments, crystallized into new standard operating procedures that assigned certain units and staff positions to supporting either "kinetic" or "non-kinetic" operations, simply meaning those during which you intend to shoot bullets and those where you don't. In most Army divisions you would now find a two-star general in command, a one-star in charge of kinetic and another one-star responsible for non-kinetic operations. My work on the PRT in Baghdad was intricately linked to this one-star general and his staff as we developed the strategies and policies related to rebuilding and supporting Iraq's government service infrastructure and civil-society institutions. But we never worked in a vacuum; our strategies were closely coordinated with the kinetic operations that involved raids on insurgent strongholds, cordon and search missions and the security of key infrastructure facilities.
I was asked about the foreign fighters that served as main driver for the insurgency, and where they were now that the levels of violence have decreased. I replied frankly that our operations successfully neutralized a number of these fighters, and broke up the networks they used to plan and execute attacks on US forces and Iraqi civilians. A typical set-up involved a foreign fighter, backed by al-Qaeda funding, sub-contracting his work out to local Iraqis. These locals would be employed to set IEDs for passing US convoys, sometimes making a hundred or two hundred dollars for a successful attack, a substantial sum in Iraq. Getting the video of the attack could double that amount. Our counterinsurgency strategy involved getting intelligence on these networks, killing or capturing the foreign-financed leader, and then making an effort to create alternative employment opportunities in those areas where local Iraqis may be susceptible to the financial incentives of supporting the insurgency.Therefore our overall strategy involved an extraordinary amount of coordination between the combat operations, and the campaigns of economic and political development targeted to support the ability of Iraqi government institutions to effectively and equitably provide services to the population.
This week's horrific attacks in Baghdad underscore the fact that while the insurgency may be down, it is certainly not out.
A few weeks before I left Baghdad, I was invited downtown to one of the city's notable social clubs. I visited with some of the middle aged and older professional gentlemen that made up the bulk of the club's membership, many of whom were enjoying a mid-day Scotch. We had lunch in the club's dining room, and then popped our heads into the main ballroom, where there was some kind of festivity occurring. It turned out to be a graduation ceremony for the Baghdad School of Dentistry. About a hundred or so of Baghdad's future dentists were having a party with their families, celebrating the completion of their training and the beginning of their new careers. I like to relate this anecdote when I talk about Iraq because it reflects what I refer to as the surprising element of the mundane to be found there. Over the past few years we have been made painfully aware of the roadside bombs, the suicide market attacks, and the strife of sectarian violence. But there's a lot going on there that we don't hear much about, that frankly may have a lot more impact on Iraq's long term future. Like dentists.As always, we enjoyed the opportunity to visit with the community leaders found within the ranks of the Rotary Club; people who know that the future of a great community like State College doesn't stay great without the hard work of selfless individuals. Special thanks to Cathy Brown and Don Bedell, pictured here with me and Steve.
