This is Part 1.
Politics and Progress
Another side of the surge
US troop fatalities in Iraq have fallen and the numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and of violent incidents reported in Baghdad show similar positive trends. The re-opening of public parks and outdoor markets, relaxed nighttime curfews and trends of increased alcohol sales and consumption are just a few of the indicators of social life creeping towards some kind of normalization due to the improved security that Baghdad has experienced over the past months. Something has been going right in Baghdad lately. While there is little debate over whether life in Baghdad has improved, there is much debate over how this change occurred.
This article is about the “surge.” That’s a loaded term, so I’ll define what I mean. In January 2007, a new shift in strategy called The New Way Forward in Iraq added over 20,000 US troops to the Baghdad area. But the surge was not just about more troops. They were deployed in smaller units in more neighborhoods, and were more focused on providing security for the local Iraqi population. So the surge was both a quantitative – and qualitative change. The overall goal of this shift in security posture was to produce the stability that would create the space necessary for the Iraqi political process to get back on track and legitimize the government.
Legitimacy for a government is connected to two things, both related to the delivery of services to its citizens. First, citizens need to feel that are connected to the political process that determines the distribution of those services and second, they need to feel that their government has the actual ability to effectively deliver those services. At the onset of the surge the Government of Iraq was failing on both counts; the political process was widely perceived to be subverted by sectarianism and government institutions were not capable of provided adequate services. The challenges were enormous. Where do you start?
A “civilian surge” adds shoes to the boots on the ground
That’s where I come in. Another aspect of the strategy shift was the “civilian surge,” an expansion of the number of State Department officers deployed to work on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Provincial Reconstruction Teams are civil/military interagency teams tasked to help provincial-level government institutions develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern while promoting increased security, rule of law, political reconciliation and economic development. I returned to the Baghdad PRT in early 2007 with the State Department after completing a previous tour with the Army in Baghdad and served as senior policy advisor in Baghdad until May 2008. Working with Iraqi politicians, civil society activists, tribal sheikhs and the occasional reformed insurgent we performed counterinsurgency and promoted governance development programs, turning short term political reconciliation into sustained participation. The thrust of this article is going to focus on a series of political initiatives launched with the Iraqi government to capitalize on breakthroughs brought on by the improved security posture of US forces. My definition of the surge emphasizes the qualitative components of the shift in strategy that go beyond its purely military aspects and I intend to convey a narrative that highlights the agency of some Iraqis that, in many ways, are the true story of the surge.
Politics in Baghdad is a full-contact sport. Who wants to play?
Since my interpretation favors an Iraqi-centric approach, let me introduce you to some of the major characters. Members of the highly organized Shia political parties play a principal role. Baghdad’s provincial government has three major positions, all filled by individuals affiliated with ISCI (the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq; led by Shia cleric Abd-al Aziz al-Hakim). Provincial Council Chairman Mueen al-Khademy, Governor Hussein al-Tahan and Mayor of Baghdad City Saber al-Esawi control key levers of power in Baghdad, with authority over millions of dollars in budgets, hiring and firing of thousands of government employees, and the disbursement of a wealth of government contracts. Baghdad is a unique province because it is home to the capital city of the nation. Because of ambiguities in Baghdad’s administrative law, traditional systems compete with post-2003 innovations and political and institutional conflicts are rife; even though they are affiliated with the same party the Provincial Council, Governor and Mayor often find themselves at odds with each other and with the national government on many issues.
Mid-level officials without strong party affiliations form another key group in Baghdad; individuals like Zaid al-Jafari at the office of Iraq’s National Security Advisor and Ali Fadel al-Misir, a former governor of Baghdad, face extraordinary challenges performing their duties. Iraq has seen its traditionally large pool of
competent civil servants reduced due to violence and flight; many who remain are cowed into supporting the more extreme impulses of a new cadre of political bosses. However, there remains a vanguard committed to speaking truth to power and using their position in government to equitably and efficiently serve the people of Iraq. Many have faced politically-motivated firings, intimidation and even assassination for their efforts, yet they continue in the face of adversity.Another group vital to this story are those who found themselves at the margins of political life in Baghdad, but for a variety of reasons decided to engage in meaningful avenues of participation, rejecting the appeal to insurgency and violent resistance to the government. The figure of Subhy al-Meshadani, the lone Sunni on the Baghdad Provincial Council, embodies the efforts of those able to bridge the gap between the politically disenfranchised and the institutions of power in Baghdad. Working with tribal leaders of the rural communities on the outskirts of Baghdad, Subhy was instrumental in creating forums to build sustainable relationships between these communities, often former al-Qaeda havens, and Baghdad’s government.
Windows of opportunity cracked open by security gains
Over the summer of 2007 the security situation began to show signs of improvement in Baghdad. The US military, working much more closely with Iraqi counterparts through a new institution called the Baghdad Operations Command, launched a series of security initiatives intended to better protect the Iraqi population. One initiative focused on protecting key markets in downtown Baghdad frequented by the largely Shia population, emplacing controlled access points and barriers designed to prevent access to suicide bombers. A second program emplaced protective barriers around Sunni neighborhoods that were prey to Shia militants pursuing a strategy of violent eviction and sectarian intimidation. Both of these measures were yielding results by mid-2007; mass casualty suicide bombings in markets dropped while the pace and ferocity of forced sectarian removals slowed.
With progress being made on the security front, eyes turned towards the political process. At the national level the Iraqi government was gripped by stalemate, but at the local level the additional troops and PRT personnel on the ground were starting to build contacts with local leaders frustrated with the performance of the political leaders running their country. We decided to focus our efforts on reconciliation “from the ground up.” Support to these local leaders in their efforts to acquire better services for their neighborhoods and villages was one way to we sought to generate enough pressure on the elite leadership of the country to make some political compromises and get Iraq on the path to progress. One major problem these local leaders demanded to have addressed was the pervasive corruption in the delivery of fuel to their neighborhoods.
