On Monday, I traveled out to the Army post at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to participate in the School for Command Preparation held there. The Army has a number of professional development courses that officers take in the course of their careers; a stint at Leavenworth prior to taking command of a battalion or brigade combat team is a common experience for many officers. There is a real desire among Army leadership to improve "interagency cooperation" between the military and civilian agencies; hence, the invitation to discuss the good, bad and ugly of the coordination I witnessed as part of the PRT on the ground and in the Embassy in Baghdad.
The PRT is an organization founded with the express intent to improve interagency cooperation at the tactical and operational level; however, the challenges we face in Iraq - even after three years of PRT implementation - are massive.
The crux of the problem comes from the inherently different perspectives that our three major institutions of foreign policy possess. I am referring to the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID, the agency responsible for the administration of US foreign aid to other countries, is technically a part of the State Department, but there are significant differences in how USAID officers and State diplomats go about their business.
The DoD is responsible for equipping, training and deploying the forces we need to fight and win wars. State is responsible for our diplomatic efforts in Embassies across the globe, keeping Washington informed of the political and economic conditions in foreign countries. USAID spends our foreign aid on development projects intending to serve the citizens of foreign nations while promoting American interests and building goodwill towards our government.
Each of these institutions has its own culture and its own bureaucracy which enable it to perform superbly the many tasks each was designed to accomplish. However, outside of a 'normal' scope of responsibilities, these institutional cultures and bureaucracies work to inhibit the performance of the additional tasks demanded by an unusual situation.
Iraq is an unusual situation.
The military is coping with duties that fall outside typical warfighting training and doctrine. The military brings enormous resources to the table and a rapid and disciplined methodology for problem solving. Unfortunately this drive and energy that thrives on immediacy and efficiency often works against the processes of development that require a longer-term horizon or a more subtle approach to complex problems.
Diplomats with experience in well-established foreign governments are rarely prepared for the dynamic environment of a politically unstable Iraq. A culture that values informed and nuanced reporting enables the production of reams of information about Iraqi politics, but is hard-pressed to develop empowered junior leaders with effective decision-making skills and the confidence to guide, coach and mentor a new generation of Iraqi leaders.
USAID development specialists, while often working in under-developed parts of the world, have struggled to operate in such a hostile and unpredictably violent environment. A system of spending aid money through local “implementing partners” lacks accountability because of the unpredictability of the security situation, and contracts for long-term development projects are often not flexible enough to take advantage of shifting tactical realities on the ground.
My talk with the Army officers at Leavenworth centered on how we at the PRT worked to synergize the strengths, and overcome the weaknesses of each of our institutions in our work to stabilize Baghdad and facilitate governance capacity within its institutions.
The key was in working to unify our planning process. The Army provides direction to subordinate units through a complex system of Operation Orders. Staff officers and NCOs work round-the-clock at each headquarters to plan, produce and disseminate documents that lay out what units are to do, when they are to do it, and what resources are provided to accomplish their missions.
The State Department generally produces consensus on objectives through discussion and argumentation before the publication of broad policy papers.
USAID develops contracts with its partners establishing developmental goals for each project and outlining expected timelines for achieving results.
Working with military, diplomatic and development experts assigned to the PRT, and reaching out to elements of their respective ‘home’ institutions, enabled us to develop a joint planning document that outlined tasks and objectives for the PRT, based upon the guidance and directives of each institution.
While the document was valuable in itself, it was merely the product of a process that fostered greater interagency cooperation – the true goal of the exercise.
While pursuing our various objectives in Iraq, whether defeating an insurgency, facilitating the establishment an effective democratic government, or producing economic growth and participative civil society, our government’s agencies often find themselves competing over bureaucratic turf or at odds on policy specifics.
The key to reducing this interagency conflict is through a more effective planning-to-execution cycle at the tactical and operational level.
When we fail at this, we add to the number of already difficult challenges we face in Iraq. However, where this can be effectively achieved, our success becomes much more likely and much less costly.
